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We show that all proposed quantum bit commitment schemes are insecure because the sender, Alice,
can almost always cheat successfully by using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen–type of attack and delaying
her measurement until she opens her commitment. [S0031-9007(97)02967-0]
PACS numbers: 89.70.+c, 03.65.Bz, 89.80.+hWork on quantum cryptography was started by Wiesner
in a paper written in about 1970, but remained unpublished
until 1983 [1]. Recently, there have been lots of renewed
activities on the subject. The most well-known application
of quantum cryptography is the so-called quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) [2–4], which is useful for making com-
munications between two users totally unintelligible to an
eavesdropper. QKD takes advantage of the uncertainty
principle of quantum mechanics: Measuring a quantum
system in general disturbs it. Therefore, eavesdropping on
a quantum communication channel will generally leave un-
avoidable disturbance in the transmitted signal which can
be detected by the legitimate users. Besides QKD, other
quantum cryptographic protocols [5] have also been pro-
posed. In particular, it is generally believed [4] that quan-
tum mechanics can protect private information while it is
being used for public decision. Suppose Alice has a secret
x and Bob a secret y. In a “two-party secure computa-
tion” (TPSC), Alice and Bob compute a prescribed func-
tion fsx, yd in such a way that nothing about each party’s
input is disclosed to the other, except for what follows
logically from one’s private input and the function’s out-
put. An example of the TPSC is the millionaires’ problem:
Two persons would like to know who is richer, but neither
wishes the other to know the exact amount of money he/
she has.
In classical cryptography, TPSC can be achieved either
through trusted intermediaries or by invoking some un-
proven computational assumptions such as the hardness
of factoring large integers. The great expectation is that
quantum cryptography can get rid of those requirements
and achieve the same goal using the laws of physics alone.
At the heart of such optimism has been the widespread
belief that unconditionally secure quantum bit commit-
ment (QBC) schemes exist [6]. Here we put such opti-
mism into very serious doubt by showing that all proposed
QBC schemes are insecure: A dishonest party can exploit
the nonlocal Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen–type correlations
[18] in quantum mechanics to cheat successfully. To do
so, she generally needs to maintain the coherence of her
share of a quantum system by using a quantum computer.
We remark that all proposed QBC schemes contain an
invalid implicit assumption that some measurements are
performed by the two participants. This is why this EPR-
type of attack was missed in earlier analysis.0031-9007y97y78(17)y3410(4)$10.00Let us first introduce bit commitment. A bit commit-
ment scheme generally involves two parties, a sender,
Alice, and a receiver, Bob. Suppose that Alice has a bit
sb ­ 0 or 1d in mind, to which she would like to be com-
mitted towards Bob. That is, she wishes to provide Bob
with a piece of evidence that she has already chosen the
bit and that she cannot change it. Meanwhile, Bob should
not be able to tell from that evidence what b is. At a
later time, however, it must be possible for Alice to open
the commitment. In other words, Alice must be able to
show Bob which bit she has committed to and convince
him that this is indeed the genuine bit that she had in mind
when she committed.
A concrete example of an implementation of bit com-
mitment is for Alice to write down her bit on a piece of
paper, which is then put in a locked box and handed over
to Bob. While Alice cannot change the value of the bit
that she has written down without the key to the box, Bob
cannot learn it himself. At a later time, Alice gives the
key to Bob, who opens the box and recovers the value
of the committed bit. This illustrative example of imple-
mentation is, however, is inconvenient and insecure. A
locked box may be very heavy and Bob may still try to
open it by brute force (e.g., with a hammer).
What do we mean by cheating? As an example, a
cheating Alice may choose a particular value of b during
the commitment phase and tell Bob another value during
the opening phase. A bit commitment scheme is secure
against a cheating Alice only if such a fake commitment
can be discovered by Bob. For concreteness, it is instruc-
tive to consider a simple QBC protocol due to Bennett and
Brassard [2]. Its procedure goes as follows: Alice and
Bob first agree on a security parameter, a positive integer s.
The sender, Alice, chooses the value of the committed bit,
b. If b ­ 0, she prepares and sends Bob a sequence of
s photons each of which is randomly chosen to be either
horizontally or vertically polarized. Of course, the value of
b is kept secret during the commitment phase. Moreover,
the actual polarization of each photon chosen by Alice is
not announced to Bob. Similarly, if b ­ 1, she prepares
and sends Bob a sequence of s photons each of which is
randomly chosen to be either 45– or 135– polarized but
once again the actual polarization of each photon is kept
secret by Alice. Bob chooses randomly between the recti-
linear (horizontal and vertical) and diagonal (45– or 135–)© 1997 The American Physical Society
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completes the commitment phase. A simple calculation
shows that the two density matrices describing the s pho-
tons corresponding to b ­ 0 and b ­ 1, respectively, are
exactly the same (and are proportional to the identity ma-
trix). Consequently, Bob cannot learn anything about the
value of b.
At a later time, Alice may open her commitment by
announcing the value of b and the actual polarization of
each of the s photons. Since Bob has chosen his basis
(rectilinear or diagonal) of measurement randomly for
each photon in the commitment phase, on average, only
half of the s photons have been measured by him in the
correct basis. For those photons, Bob can verify that
Alice’s announced polarizations match his measurement
results. Baring EPR attacks, a cheating Alice may, for
example, send rectilinear photons in the commitment
phase (hence commits to b ­ 0) but tell Bob that they are
diagonal photons in the opening phase (hence announces
b ­ 1). This is cheating. Alice then has to make a
random guess for the polarizations of the photons that Bob
has measured along the diagonal basis. Since Bob, on
average, measures sy2 photons along the diagonal basis,
Alice, with such a cheating strategy, has only a probability
of s1y2dsy2 for success. See [7] for details.
A key weakness of Bennett and Brassard’s scheme is
that Alice can always cheat successfully by using EPR
pairs. Alice can prepare s EPR-pairs of photons and send
a member of each pair to Bob during the commitment
phase. She skips her measurements and decides on the
value of b only at the beginning of the opening phase.
If she chooses the value of b to be 0, she measures
the polarization of the photons in her share along the
rectilinear basis. It is a standard property (the EPR
paradox) of an EPR pair that Alice’s measurement result
on a photon will always be perpendicular to Bob’s result
on the other photon of the pair. Alice can, therefore,
proudly announce those polarizations. Similarly, for
b ­ 1, she simply measures along the diagonal basis and
proceeds in a similar manner. There is no way for Bob to
detect this attack.
Bennett and Brassard noted this weakness in the
same paper in which they proposed their scheme [2].
Nonetheless, new QBC schemes have been proposed and
it has been generally accepted in the literature [4,7,8]
that they defeat an EPR-type of attack. Our goal here is
to demonstrate that, contrary to popular belief, precisely
the same type of EPR attack defeats all proposed QBC
schemes.
All proposed schemes involve only one-way commu-
nications from Alice to Bob. On the conceptual level,
they all involve Alice sending two quantum systems to
Bob, one during the commit phase and the other during
the opening phase. (There is no loss of generality in our
analysis in considering quantum communications alone
since classical communications is just a special case ofquantum communications.) More precisely, the general
procedure of any proposed QBC scheme can be rephrased
in the following manner.
(1) Alice chooses the value of a bit b to which she
would like to be committed towards Bob. If b ­ 0, she
prepares a state
j0l ­
X
i
ai jeilA › jfilB , (1)
where kei j ejlA ­ dij but the normalized states jfilB’s
are not necessarily orthogonal to each other. Similarly, if
b ­ 1, she prepares a state
j1l ­
X
j
bjje0jlA › jf0jlB , (2)
where ke0i j e0jlA ­ dij but jf0jlB’s are not necessarily
orthogonal to each other.
Both Alice and Bob are supposed to know the states
j0l and j1l. This implies, in particular, that both of them
know the states jfilB and jf0jlB.
(2) An honest Alice is now supposed to make a
measurement on the first register and determine the value
of i if b ­ 0 s j if b ­ 1d.
(3) Alice sends the second register to Bob as a piece of
evidence for her commitment.
(4) At a later time, Alice opens the commitment by
declaring the value of b and of i or j.
(5) Bob performs measurements on the second register
to verify that Alice has indeed committed to the genuine
bit. More precisely, the data received from Alice (the
values of b and also i or j) should be correlated with
Bob’s experimental results on the second register. If
such expected correlations do appear, Bob accepts that
Alice has executed the protocol honestly. Otherwise, Bob
suspects that Alice is cheating.
We emphasize that all proposed QBC schemes follow
the five-step procedure described above. For instance,
Bennett and Brassard’s scheme described earlier falls into
this class if we give Bob the liberty to store up his photons
and measure them only after the opening (step 4) of the
commitment by Alice. But, if Alice can cheat against
even such a powerful Bob, clearly she can cheat against
Bob who has no such storage capability.
Our proof of insecurity of QBC goes as follows: First
of all, in order that Bob cannot tell what b is, the second
register (the quantum system that Bob receives during
the commit phase) must contain very little information
about which bit Alice has committed to. As a start, let
us consider the ideal case in which the second register
contains absolutely no information about the value of
b. (Bennett and Brassard’s scheme [2] and Ardehali’s
scheme [9] are ideal whereas Brassard and Crépeau’s
scheme [7] and the most well-known BCJL scheme [8]
are nonideal. We sill come to the nonideal case near the
end of this Letter.) In the ideal case, to ensure that Bob
has no information about the committed bit b, the density3411
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bits 0 and 1 are the same, i.e.,
TrAj0l k0j ; rB0 ­ rB1 ; TrAj1l k1j . (3)
It then follows from the Schmidt decomposition [19]
that
j0l ­
X
k
p
lkjeˆklA › jfˆklB , (4)
and
j1l ­
X
k
p
lkjeˆ0klA › jfˆklB , (5)
where hjeˆklAj, hjeˆ0klAj, and hjfˆklBj are orthonormal bases
of the corresponding Hilbert spaces and lk’s are the
eigenvalues of the reduced density operator, TrAj0l k0j ­
TrAj1l k1j. Notice that the lk’s and jfˆklB’s are the same
for the two states and the only difference lies in Alice’s
system jeˆklA’s vs jeˆ0klA’s. Now consider the unitary
transformation UA which maps jeˆklA to jeˆ0klA. It clearly
maps j0l to j1l. Note that the transformation UA acts on
Alice’s system alone and yet rotates j0l to j1l. That is,
Alice can apply UA without Bob’s help. Therefore, Alice
can cheat by changing b ­ 0 to b ­ 1 in the opening
phase.
More concretely, consider the following cheating
strategy: In the first step, Alice always prepares j0l
corresponding to b ­ 0. She then skips the second
(measurement) step and sends the second register to Bob
as prescribed in the third step. She decides on the value
of b to announce only in the beginning of the opening
phase (step 4). Should she now choose b to be zero,
she executes the protocol honestly. On the other hand,
if she now chooses b to be one, she applies the unitary
transformation UA to rotate j0l to j1l and executes the
protocol for b ­ 1 instead. Consequently, Alice can
always cheat successfully. Notice that Alice is able to
cheat primarily because she can delay her measurement
until step four. To do so, Alice generally needs a quantum
computer. While it is a challenging technological feat to
build a quantum computer, it is not forbidden by the laws
of quantum physics. The possibility of a dishonest Alice
skipping the second step (i.e., delaying her measurements)
was not considered in Ref. [8]. This was the chief reason
why earlier researchers came to the erroneous conclusion
that the BCJL scheme is provably unbreakable.
In the above discussion, we have assumed the ideal
situation in which Bob has absolutely no information
about the value of b during the commitment phase
and hence the density matrices describing the second
register for the two cases b ­ 0 and b ­ 1 are the
same. [See Eq. (3)]. However, Brassard and Crépeau’s
scheme [7] and the BCJL scheme [8] are nonideal in
the sense that they violate Eq. (3) slightly and give Bob
some probability of distinguishing between rB0 and rB1 .
Intuition seems to indicate that this is not going to change
our conclusion: On the one hand, if Bob has a large3412probability of distinguishing between the two states, the
scheme will be unsafe against a cheating Bob. On the
other hand, if Bob has only a very small probability of
distinguishing between the two states, clearly the two
density matrices rB0 and rB1 must be close to each other in
some sense and essentially the same physics should apply.
Following Mayers [20], we now consider the nonideal
case when rB0 Þ rB1 . The closeness between two states
of B specified by the two density matrices rB0 and rB1
is commonly described by the concept fidelity [21] which
can be defined in terms of purifications. Imagine a system
A attached to Bob’s system B. There are many pure states
jc0l and jc1l on the composite system such that
TrAsjc0l kc0jd ­ rB0 and TrAsjc1l kc1jd ­ rB1 . (6)
The pure states jc0l and jc1l are called the purifications
of the density matrices rB0 and rB1 . The fidelity can be
defined as
FsrB0 , r
B
1 d ­ maxjkc0 j c0lj , (7)
where the maximization is over all possible purifications,
0 # F # 1. F ­ 1 if and only if rB0 ­ rB1 . We remark
that for any fixed purification of rB1 , e.g., j1l in Eq. (2),
there exists a maximally parallel purification of rB0 which
satisfies Eq. (7).
For nonideal QBC schemes, the fact that Bob has a
small probability for distinguishing between rB0 and rB1
means that [19]
FsrB0 , r
B
1 d ­ 1 2 d (8)
for some small d . 0. It then follows from Eqs. (7) and
(8) that, for the state j1l given in Eq. (2), there exists a
purification jc0l of rB0 such that
jkc0 j 1lj ­ FsrB0 , rB1 d ­ 1 2 d . (9)
The strategy of a cheating Alice for a nonideal bit
commitment scheme is the same as before. She prepares
the state j0l corresponding to b ­ 0 in the first step, skips
the second (measurement) step, and sends the second
register to Bob as prescribed in the third step. She decides
on the value of b only in the beginning of the opening
phase (step 4). If she now chooses b ­ 0, she simply
follows the rule. If she chooses b ­ 1, she applies a
unitary transformation to the quantum system on her share
to obtain the state jc0l which satisfies Eq. (9). Such a
unitary transformation exists because, as can be seen in
the Schmidt decomposition [19], all purifications jflAB
of a fixed density matrix rB are related to one another
by unitary transformations acting on A alone and A is in
Alice’s hands. Notice that if Alice had been honest, she
would have prepared j1l in the first step instead. [See
Eq. (2).] Nonetheless, since jc0l and j1l are so similar
to each other [see Eq. (9)], Bob clearly has a hard time
in detecting the dishonesty of Alice. Therefore, Alice can
cheat successfully with a very large probability.
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Note added.—The insecurity of the BCJL scheme [8]
has also been investigated independently by Mayers [20].
More recently, Mayers [22] has generalized the above re-
sult to prove that all quantum bit commitment schemes,
including ones that involve two-way (quantum) commu-
nications between Alice and Bob, are insecure. The same
result and the impossibility of ideal quantum coin tossing
are discussed in our recent preprint [23]. The impossi-
bility of some other quantum protocols has recently been
demonstrated by Lo [24]. These surprising discoveries
constitute a major setback to quantum cryptography. The
exact boundary to the power of quantum cryptography re-
mains an important subject for future investigations.
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